How Good is Gold? by Magnus, A.A.
Gold, tM val1Ul of which used everywhere to be taken for granted, ha4 not been
excluded from the colossal proceslI of revaluation of all values taking place ill the
world at the present time. We ho~'e asked Dr. ,11ognus, whQm our ref/ders know
as the author of seL'eral pene/.rating art'ieles on economy. to a.naly:e the problem of
gold i" the past and th.e pr/J.'Jcnt. In undertaking to write a.boul so complex a 8uilject
WI tM gold stalldard within the limitations of a magazine a.rticle. the author is bmmd
to tllke too much for grUllted for some readers and too little for oth.ers. In order not
to make his article too i'lltlOlved, Dr. lIffl.gllUS has tUled the qltlmtitative equat'ion of
f money ·in itll simpiesl form and has a.voided a detai/c.d discusBion of discoullt and
interest poliey.-K.lIf.
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cheaper, as they have during the last few
decades, the price of gold may be reduced
to such an extent that gold plates will no
longer be the privilege of. kings. At any
rate, dental repairs would become a lot
cheaper. .
GOLD MONEY
In order to be able to exchange the fruits
of his labor for other objects, man created
money_ Money is a means of transporting
work as well as the realization of demand.
It is just as much a means of transport as
railways, ships, telegraph, and telephone.
Like all means of transport, money it!
dependent on certain technical prel"e<luisites
in order for it to function properly. And
its functions are: a medium of exchange
and It atanda.rd of value.
I
Man began by using objects taken from
among his own requirements. Thus he used
cattle, salt, or shells as a medium of ex-
change, as money. A commodity did not
become money as the result of lin official
stipulation but simply as the result of
custom. The more mankind hegan to spe-
cialize in different types of work, and the
more the various occupations began to differ
. from each other, the more problematical did
a means of exchange become that w:as
limited to definite use. How can an artisan,
who owns no land and has no pasture rights,
accept cattle in exchange for his products!
Hence some medium of exchange had to be
found whose use and storage were not
. dependent upon occupational conditions.
Metal!! inevita bly recommended thcmselve~
for this purpose among all the ral'es. Xhe
possibility of immedia.te. utilization thus
receded hefore the intrinsic value of the
metal.
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GLITTERING gold! Human beingshave always been attracted, glad-dened, but also led astray by this
glitter. The curse of gold in the saga of
the Nibelungs is sufficient proof that, even
in prehistoric times, man was already aware
of the conflict between the beauty and the
evil of gold.
As good as gold! Here gold is set up as
a standard, perfect and impervious to
()utward change.
Gold as an ornament and gold as a hoard:
these are the two uses to which mankind
first put this metal. As time went on, it
revealed other qualities. Without inorrtinate
expense, it could be obtained in uniform
. purity; nevertheless, it was snrt has always
remained comparatively rare. Gold is easy
to transport, easy to hide, and is not es-
sential to the maintenance of lffe. This
last Cluality recommended its use for a pur-
pose whioh cattle, shells, or slaves had
hitherto served: for use as money.
Not until modem times has there been
an appreciable use of gold in medicine and
industry. In the first .decade after the
Great War, twenty to thirty per cent of the
world's gold production was used for arts
and crafts, industry, and medicine.
In studying the problem of gold, we must
always bear in mind that gold is nothing
but a commodity, just like silver or salt,
which can be put to various uses. Silver
used formerly to be a treasure; today any
moderately well-off man in a silver-pro-
ducing country can a.fford to have plates
made of silver. Should the use of gold'
decline in the world, and should the proc-
CSlleS of obtaining gold continue to become
Before this could happen, however, it
was essential that there be a system of
·weights. With their sexagesimal systeJll of
weights the Itncient Babylonianll were prob-
ably the first widely to employ precious
metals 8S money. But the possibilities of
ascertaining the purity of the metals were
still very limited. Neither the Babylonians
nor the Egyptians nor the Chinese thought
of fixing the degree of purity of a piece of
metal by stamping it. The first ones to
progress beyond the mere determination of
weight were the Lydian!." in Asia Minor, who
in the seventh century B.C. minted coins.
as minting metal. Furthermore, there waa
the subdivision of the baaic units. After
all, it was one of the advantages of metal
that it could be divided according to require-
ments, while a slave or an ox being used
as a monetary unit could not very well
be split up. This confUBion of the many
different kinds of coins was a calam~,y which
lasted for thousands of years. 'I'oward the
end of the ~{iddle Ages, for instance, there
were six hundred mints in Germany alone.
The situation in Italy waa similar, while
France and England managed to centmlize
their minting systems earlier, thanks to
their earlier political centralization.
It was inevitable that a state whose
powers were on the increase should seek for
a uniform monetary system in the interests
of its people. There were two points to·
which particular attention had to be paid:
the relationship between intrinsic value and
monetary unit, and the relationship among
the various minting metals.
In economic life there is a sort of law of
inertia. People become accustomed to a
certain relationship between intrinsic valne
and monetary units, say, for instance, be-
tween the gold content aud the term "ducat."
When this relations~ip has rema,ined stable
for a number of years, they believe in a
natural relationship betwecn material and
unit and are slow to notice any decrease in
the gold content of the ducat. Sometimes
they will continue to give the same quantity
of goods for the ducat for a long time, and
the further they are from the big towns the
longer they will go on doing this. This
phenomenon can be exploited for good as
well as for evil. In 594 B.C., Solon reduced
the gold content of the Athenian coins by
a quarter in order to relieve the general
indebtedness from which the economic life
of Athens threatened to suffocate. But
there have also been kings who shunned the
effort c;>f working out a proper state budget
&nd who bal&nced the resultant deficits by
coin deterioriation. Coin deteriorations
have occurred throughout the 2,500 years
up to the establishment of the gold standard.
They represent the devaluations of their
times.
Coin deterioration waa often unavoidable
because there waa not enough metal in the
country t.o mint the required quantity of
coins of full value. On the other hand
there have also been cases where the quantity
of circulating money rose considerably,
either aa the result of collected war indem-
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CONFUSION OF COINS
The time it took from the first gold coin
to the creation of the first gold~stRndard
currency was no less than 2,500 years! The
English gold currency was eMtablished in
1816. 'We can only touch upon the painful
process which mankind has passed through
in the twenty-five centuries up to the crea-
tion of this monetary system. A close study
of it shows one that monetary systems are
just a:l imperfect ancl subject to change as
all other human institutions.
What, then, were the worst pangs in this
2,500-year.long road to the gold standard?
While formerly commodities whose value
could not be sharply. defined served I\S means
of payment, mankind now possessed pieces
of metal which could be minted a,ccording
to requirement as units of a certain size
and which were interchangeable. But who
had the right to mint? Was it not possible
fol' one to be cheated since, in spite of the
minting, one could not tell whether the
money had full value or not? '''hen cattle
was tised as a means of exchange, everyone
could judge the value for himself, although
this value couJd always only be estimated
roughly; now only the dealers in gold and
silver conld really asses!; tile value. In
order to circumvent the dangers threatening
here, the state 'authorities granted minting
monopolies to trllstworthy persons or to
persons whom they believed to be tmst-
worthy. Since the borders of the, various
domains were in part ill-defined, and many
towns possessed state authority and their
own minting right, many kinds of newly
minted monetary units came into being
which circulated simultaneously.
Even in Lydia there were from the very
beginning two kinds of gold coins based on
different weight systems. In addition to
this, gold competed with silver and copper
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nities or as a result of discoveries of large
metal deposits within the domain of the
currency. If -in such cases the quantity of
g~ produced in the country did not rise
in the sam&- proportion-and before the
development of modern industry this was
possible only to n. very limited extent----
there were more monetary units to every
commodity unit, i.e., prices rose. In mod-
ern terms, this meant inflation with all
its unpleasant consequences. Thu!J we sec
that even in the times of metal money there
were cases of a foolish creditor nation
causing an unbalancing of the gold and
Ili1ver stDcks, thereby violating the laws
enabling money to function as a. means of
transportation-usually in the end to its
own hann. This error is cited as one of
the causes of the downfall of the Spanish
world empire.
A HEADACHE FOR THE STATE
To cover the demand for means of pay-
ment, the state had, until the creation -of
serviceable money, to let gold and silver
circulate simultaneously. This resulted in
the problem of maintaining a comparatively
stable relatiouship between the value of
gold and silver. If the face value and
metal value of a coin are tq be identical
and the relationship in the value of two
metals changcs, the ~ce values of the coins
would really have to be changed accordingly.
This, however, would contradict the law of
inertia in economics, which calls for the
utmost lltability of prices, i.e.: the retention
of the old relationship between the quantity
of goods and the quantity of money.
What was to be donel At one time,
more Ililver was found, 80 that gold became
comparatively more rare and thus more
expensive and everyone demanded payment
in gold coins; at another time, it was the
ot-her way round. In the early history of
Europe, the relationllhip of the value of a
kilogram of gold to the value of a kilogram
of silver fluctuated between 1:9 and 1:13.,
After the collapse of the' Roman Empire,
a lot of gold was withdrawn from circula.
tion for pUrposetl of hoarding, and the reo
Iationship shifted to as muoh as 1:18. Dur-
ing the Middle Ages the old relationship
grad,!ally returned, with the fluotuations
becoming 1688, lying between 1:10 and 1:12.
After 1500 A.D. the discoveries of silver
increased at a greater rate than thoec of
gold. Fluctuations grew bigger. But until
1870-nevcr more than 16 kilograms of silver
were given for one kilogram of gold. Not
until then did the increaaing devaluation of
silver start which continued without any
noticeable relapse until 1933, by which
time the relationship between gold and
silver had become 1:76. This crash caused
the American silver.mine owners and workers
to induce Roosevelt to support and fix the
price of silver. It is an interesting fact
that the country which pretends t-o be
fighting for free economics disregarded the
"natural" price and fixed tho purcha.'ling
price for silver in the USA at such a level
that the relationship between gold and
silver became 1:27. _ As a result of this
ast-onishing price, the silver of China and
India flowed into the United St-ates, 80 that
800 million people saw themselves deprived
of their acoustomed medium of exchange.
We must return to the eighteenth century
once more to obtain a clear idea of the
gold.~ver problem. Gold is too rare a
metal for it to be able to cover the entire
demands of a COWltry for means of payment.
Hence silver must also be used.' There are
two systems for regulating the relationship
of gold to silver: double currency and parallel
currency. In the case of a double currency,
the state fixes a finn relationship between
gold and silver. This system usually foun.
dera in practice on the fact that the relation-
ship in the market value of gold and silver
is constantly fluctuating and does not agree
with the fixed relationship.
England made many vain attempts with
the double currency through the centu•.
In 1663 it was decided to switch to another
system, that of parallel currency. The
various gold coins formed one system, and
the various silver coins a second, independent
system. Their relationship was determined
da.ily according to the relationship of the
market value of gold and silver. The con-
stant complicated calculations proved 80
exceseively inconvenient that in 1718 the
country returned to the double currency.
As it was found impossible to give the silver
a proper value, the government was forced
in 1774 to limit the legal paying power of
silver coins. From then on, it was not
necessary to accept more than £25 sterling
in silver. This dealt a. blow to the legal
double currency in England from which it
was never to recover. The second blow
came in 1790, when the market price of
silver fell considerably. As a result, the
government prohibited the minting of silver
for private account, and with this rescinding
of the free minting right for silver the gold
standard was practically created.
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TABLE I
Introduction of the Gold Standard
Heilltionsbip
•Yoors of Gold to Countrios
Silver
1810/20 l:UUH England (1810)
1870/75 l:lU.97 German Empire (1871),
Holland lllld Scan·
dinavia (1873)
1876/80 1:17.81 Latin Currency Union -
(1878)
1896/1900 1:33.48 Japan (1897), United
States (1000)
rared in the regulations concerning metal
coverage.
The more silver became devaluated, the
more the English example of gold currency
was followed in other countries. The dif·
ficulties which had arisen throughout the
history of Europe from the fluctuations of
gold and silver gradually passed into obliv·
ion. There was a general feeling of relief,
and people forgot that there might also be
a hitch in the gold.standard system.
The advantages of a uniform monetary
standard. especially for trade and account·
ing, which could be observed in the case of
England led the newly united German
Empire to follow her example in 1871, all
the more so as the French war indemnity,
which had to be paid in gold. fonned a
solid basis for the introduction of a gold
standard. The Scandinavian. countries and
Holland, which were closely linked to Ger·
many by their trade and their geographical
position. followed suit in a few years, ale
though the relationship between gold and
silver did not yet directly force them to
this step_ In their case, the increase in
railway communications lUld thus of foreign
trade may have been the principal motive.
The fact that Central Europe now required
less silver for currency purposes was bound
to have an unfavorable effect on the market
price of silver. The Latin Currency Union
(France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland)
introduced the gold standard in 1878, when
silver declined further in .value. Japan
went over to the gold standard in 1897,
when China had to pay her 360 million yen
in war indemnities in gold for the war of
1895/98. The silver·producing states in the
tJSA fought desperately against the intro·
duction of the gold standard, but in 1900
they were defeated by foreign-trade interests.
Thereafter ·the English mint minted only
gold coins for private account, namely,
77s/lOid from every ounce-of standard gold
(11/12 fine). Anyone who brought gold
WIUI given coins at this rate less a small
minting charge, and anyone who brought
gold coins wortb 77s/lO!d received one
ounce of standard gold. Silver money was
minted only by the state and had a lower
sill-er content than its face value represented.
It became money like paper money, which
owes its value to the power of the state.
15 YEARS Oil' INTERNATIONAL
GOLD STANDARD
So far we have spoken chiefly of gold
money in its function lUI a standard of value
and of the uncertain state of affairs arising
from the competition of silver. Now we
shall turn more to gold's function as a
medium of exchange. Whether these two
functions can really be separated "ill be
dealt with later.
With thl'! spreading industrial development
it became doubtful whether bills of ex·
change would suffice as the sole additional
means of payment beside metal coins.
After France's unsuccessful experiments with
paper money in 1720 and 1790, Prussia and
England were more successful during the
Napoleonic Wars. As a result, the Ulle of
bank notes increased rapidly throughout the
nineteenth century. Then cheques were
illtroduc-ed. Bills of exchange arc covered
b... goods, and cheques by credits. The
bank note represents a mixture of goods
and credit coverage. While up to now any
increase in trade had required a correspond.
ing increase of precious metals, a period of
saving precious metals by means of cheques
and bank notes now began. Formerly the
existing reserves of gold and silver had rep·
resented a relatively inellUltic quantity as
opposed to the quanti'y of goods offered in
trade. If the quantity of precious metal
increased more rapidly than the ,quantity of
goods, thcro wero more pieces of gold and , ------c~~:-:--.......:__:---------
silver for each unit of goods, and prices rose.
If the quantity of precious metals did not
follow the increl\8C in the quantity of goods,
prices fell. By means of paper money, a
certain elasticity betwoon the two quantities
could be achieved. However, it is always
difficult to determine the size of the entire
quantity of money as well 88 the size of the
total quantity of goods, 80 that the actions
of the note·issuing banks, which were en·
trusted with paper, gold, and silver, remained
4Somparatively mechanical. They are mir·
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At any rate, the gold-standard system
wa.~ by no means as automntic as it wa.~
generally' described. The IIlILnagement of
the central bank was free to decide what it
would regard as adequate gold cO\'erage; for
as a rule the note-issuing banks had far
more gold t,han was needed for the minimum
coverage stipulated by law, so that tho
management was not dependent on this
minimum coverage in its action. Conse-
q ucnUy, the gold -st.andard currency was a.
far more "manipulated" currency than
would have been admitted at the time.
Naturally, political considerations were lia.ble
to ha\"e a strong influence on t.hese decisions,
simultaneously that the cost of domestic
credits went up. Here we have the contact
point between the international commodity
gold and the domestic price level. The
increase in the cost of domestic credits leads
to a reduction in thc circulation of bank
notes and thus to an increase of the gold
coverage of the notes, but at the same timo
to a downward pressure on the domestic
price level. With the decrease of prices.
exports rise, more gold is brought into tho
country, nnd the discount mte can be reo
duced. Wit.h the increase of gold. credits
can be increased again, and the general price
le\'el rises again slowly, until ex ports dccline
and with them the import of gold.
The outcome of the system is a liuking
up of the domestic with the foreign J,rico
10\"e1. This produces an increased fQFeign
trade, but at the same hme a flensitirt.'ness
on the part of every domestic eCOllomjc
process toward any perceptible chan~~ gf
price in the world. As a result of - thifl·
linked-up price level, the production f~
wheat, for example, may become unprofi!-:
able in Sweden without any change h~ing·
occurred in t,hat country. It is su~ie»t.
that whelLt production in Call1Lda sllPuld
become so cheap that Canadian wheat:-plu8
shipping costs can be offered chea~' in
Sweden than Swedish wheat. In Ather
words, through the import of Canadjan
wheat, the Swedish trade balance becomes
passive, and the pressure on prioes occurs
which we explained above. If the Swedish
farmers would now reduce their standard of
living, they could rid themselves of the
Canadian competition. This example is
enough to indicate some of t.he principal
political problems. Hence it is doubtful
whether the gold standard was really so
unpolitical as it has always been claimed
to be.
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DEFECTS OF THE GOLD STAXDA.RD
If one bears in mind that the gold standard
was first introduced by the largest gold-
producing country, England, and was skill·
fully propagated by her for a hundred
years; if one remembers that the next great
gold-standard country was Germany, who
wanted to invest her gold war indemnity in
a profitable way; and if one finally sees
that Japan was in a similar position---one
is tempted to doubt whether it was really
only the pract,icality of the system itself
which led to its introduction. .
But let us assume that this was really the
case. The special advantages of the gold
standard are said to be thlLt it makes possible
a uniform system of world prices, that it is
automatic and unpolitical, and that it
guarantees a comparati\'ely uniform dis-
tribut,ion of the gold resen'cs of the world.
In allY case, the gold standard had the one
advantage that in it the price of gold was
a simple, uniform yardstick by which to
measure all other prices. H, for instance, in
Sweden the prices of commodities rose in
comparison to tho price of gold, this meant
that her export prices rose and tho quantity
of goods she exported sank. The conse·
quence of this was a passi\'e trade balance
and t.he export of gold to cover tho deficit.
This in turn meant that the gold coverage
for the note issue of t.he Swed.ish State Bank
sank. a coverage which, as in every gold-
standard country, is fixed at a certain ratio
in order to maint.ain the people's confidence
in the paper money. In order to I\ttract
gold, the Swedish central bank had now to
raise its rat~ of discount above that pre·
vailing in neighboring countries, which meant
With the introduction of the gold standard
in the United States began the legendary
fi.ftee'l years of the widespread gold standard
-i.e., the adopting of the English currency
system and tho acceptance of British financial
world domination-which were to end 80
abruptly in the Great War. After the Great
War, the re-establishment of the inter-
national gold standard was struggled for as
if it were a matter of returning to a cultural
heritage pro\'OO throughout the centuries.
MOfCO\"er, these attempts were made to
revive a system the conditions for which
had been changed fundamentally and in
which such vast, densely l~pulated coun·
tries as China and India had not participated
-quite aside from the fact that now there
were two cent,ers of world finance, London
and New York.
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whether they concerned the discount policy
or an open-market policy.
A furt.her restriction on the automatic
working of the gold standard resulted from
the fact that, in times of economic difficulty,
those countries which exported capital could
limit these exports or those countries im·
porting capital could make efforts to in-
crease their foreign loans. Both these steps
are, of course, of 0. h.ighly pol.itieal nature.
MoreO\'er, the pOllsibilitics of a loan policy
show that the distribution. of gold ncod not
be uniform at all. Indeed, it was fairly
uniform during the cent ury before the Great
War for the 80Ie reason that England used
her active balance of payments, not to hoard
gold,- but to extepd long-term foreign loans.
The-United States felt herself free of any
8uch obl.igation and thus made the gold-
stanl1a.rd systein unfCMible.
--
--- THE OOJ..L,U'SE OF TUE aOLD STANnA.RD
~- We have seen that, for thousands of yean!,
.gol~ was only one among several metal
.Ulea~s of exchange, and that it was not
until: the second half of the nineteenth
century that it rose to a position of sole
domination. By now the comparative rarity
of ~ld and silver 'had oc'Come so unequal
thaf.=it was no longer possible to base any
rela ionship on the natural searcity of the
two metalB. The production of gold had
increased to such an extent that gold alone
became sufficient, all the more so since paper
means of payment were simultaneously
widely resorted to. Here the gold standard
began to be undermined, even before the
Great War, in so far as aetual payments in
gold were gradually found to be inconvenient
and expensive, and it became common
practice to form large gold reserves in t.he
vaults of the note-issuing btmks and to hold
gold demand not,es on foreign countries.
However, the gold standard did not re-
ceive its first serious blow UJitil the Great
War, when the obligation to redeem bank
notes against gold was rescinded in all
European cOllntries. N'll>oleon had financed
aU his wars with metal money, and a hundred
years later the governments believed that
such huge quantitic.~ of gold would be
needed for imports that the domestic gold
circulation would have to be suspended.
In actulli fact, however, the rescinwng of
the gold-coverage stipulations was needed to
free the hands of the governments to print
money for the increasing domestic require-
ments for means of payment. Although the
import requ.irements of many belligerent
countries were considerable, to everyone's
astonishment the international value o.f gold
sank. In other words, the demand for
many goods whose production decl.ined as a.
result of the war rOBe to such an extent that
the buyers were willing to pay morc gold
for a. commodity unit than before the war.
This distortion of commodity prices con-
tinued during the first few years after the
war and provided a d.iBappointmcnt .to those
countries which had acquired large quantities
of gold as supplicn! during the war. Not
trotH the first hlmger for goods had been
satisfied after Ule war did commodity prices
decline, which meant a'rise in the value of
gold. By now, however, this value of gold
was really too high again for the re·establish-
ment of the gold standard, which was now
being attempted as if it were a symbol of
true peace-actually with far too much
emotion, a curious phenomenon in connec-
tion with so prosaic a. thing as money.
Wide circles believed that the best gllar-
antee for the economic prosperity of a.
country was for it t.() participate in world
trade in the !lame BeDSe as before the war.
To this end, no other means could be thought
of than that the country should have a
gold.standard currency. Since many of the
countries concerned did not have l:Iufficient
gold to let it oirculate 88 ourrency within
their borden!, they had to be satisfied with
a. gold-reoorve cllrrency. In this form of
gold currency, the central bank is.'lues ir-
redeemable notes for .circulation while ruain-
taining a gold resefve which guarantees a
cert,ain relationship between one gram of
gold IUld the monetary unit.. The only gold
movements that take place are those be·
twcon banks for international clearing pur-
poMCS.
This gold-standard system worked under
the assumption that, among all commodities,
the value of gold had the greatest inertia
and thus was best suited for the payment
of long.term obl.igatiol1s. But what was fOf-
gotten was that the gold distribut,ion in the
world had meanwhile changed. The United
States and France bad collected sllch vast
gold trea.sures that a domestic currency
measure which might be quite ren.8onable
wit,h.in the country could have far.reaching
effects on the rest of the world, effects wh.ich
could not be countered as had been possible
, in times when all countries had large gold
stocks at their wsposal for counteropera-
tiona.
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A vast literature has been published on
this currency crash, which in.flicted losses
upon the world that can be compared only
to those brought by the Great War. In
oonnection with our theme, we must first
remind our readers of that phenomenon
which is known as "gold shortage." .As the
result of the excessive price level, it beoame
impossible to mine gold in quantities cor-
responding to the increase in the world's·
production of commodities. The following
table shows the world's production of gold.
TABLE III
Annual World Gold Production
. (in 1,000 kg.)
1901/05 485 1933 785
1906/10 652 1934 740
1911/15 702 1935 930
1916/20 591 1936 1,016
1921/25 540 1937 1,075
1926/30 611 1938 1,145
1928 600 1939 1,215
1929 610 19<W 1,340
1930 640 1941 1,310
1931 680 1942 1,190
1932 740 1943 990 (estimated)
Since about 1924 the gold standard had
been reintroduced for the various currencies.
The world production of commodities had
increased rapidly as II. result of this stabiliza-
tion, but there was no question of II. cor-
responding increase in the production of
gold: it remained more or less steady at
around 600,000 kilograms a year. However,
the simple catchword "gold shortage" is
not enough to characterize the situation
before the world economic crisis. The re-
sponsibility for this disaster was rather to be
found to II. large extent in the impossible
construction of reparations and inter-Allied
debts.' It stripped first Germany and then
gradually the rest of the world of its gold
reserves. The result was II. grotesque in-
equality in the supply .ofgold, which was
veiled by the short-term lending of gold to
the states without gold. The United Sta,tes
believed it to be possible to maintain an
active trade balance and simultaneously to
collect d~bts. Since the USA would accept
no goods, these debts could only be paid in
Argentina
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TABLJlI II
Currency Devaluations As a Result of the
World Economic Crlsla
The new gold parities were fixed at very
high levels, so that, with declining com-
modity prices, a. credit could tum into a
dangerous burden. Moreover, as the result
of the wa,r, there was II. large quantity of
short-term credits throughout the world,
which could quickly. be called up from one
country to another. In this utllltable situa-
tion the collapse of a. stock boom in New
York in 1929 produ.oed unexpected conse·
quences. It led to a collapse of the raw-
material markets. This beginning of what
has been called the world economic crisis
meant that for one commodity unit, for
which hitherto one gold unit had to be paid,
now only half a gold unit had to be paid.
Or, vice versa, for one gold unit, for which
one had hitherto given one commodity unit,
one had now to give two commodity units.
With this the former inertia in the relation-
ship between commodities and gold, i.e., in
the last analysis the fOlwdation of the gold
standard, had collapsed.
This crash of commodity prices, or this
increase in the value of gold, meant that all
debts suddenly represented double the com-
modity value. All wages, all taxes, sudden.
ly had double the commodity value. In
the long rtin, no economic system can stand
Buch II. strain. It became apparent that
one country after another had to change its
former ratio of gold unit to monetary unit.
The value of the gold unit was reduced,
either in a firm relationship or II. fluctuating
one to the price of gold. The following list
of devaluation shows the landslide the con-
sequences of which the currency experts of
the whole world have tried to overcome for
ten years, up to the outbreak of the present
war.
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gold, ami the product,ion of gold was ex-
pensive. Jo~inally, gold became so scarce
that it rose rapidly in value, i.e., commodity
prices crashed. The various currencies lost
their bahmce, and in the end the debt pay-
ments to the USA had to be st.opped entirely.
The American gold "experts" now at-
temptctl to make it pos.'lible for the debtors
to pay by reducing the gold value of tho
dollar. Roosevelt and his advisers were
proud when they increased the value of the
troy ounce of fine gold from 820.67 to $35.00
in 1933. The US dollar, which formerly
contained 0.048 ounces of gold, now con-
tained only 0.029 ounces, i.e., it had only
60 per cent of its former gold or commodity
value. Like old Solon of Athens, Roosevelt
made thc dollar lighter in order to lighten
the burdpn of debts. According to his own
•statement, Roosevelt hoped by- t.his means
if possible t.o arrive at It less fluctuating.
purchasing power of the dollar. He said
that he want.ed to find that kind of a dollar
which even II generat.ion later would ha"e
the same purehasing power ~d debt-pay-
mpnt power as the dollar of the immediate
fut,ure. This desire for sta.bilization is con-
tradicted by the powcr given to him at the
same time by Congrt'ss if necessary to in-
crease the gold-purchasing price by as much
as another 20 per cent. in these circum-
stances. one could no longer speak of gold
all an ultimate standard of value.
As a I'('sult of the general crash in com-
modity prices, those thingll had also become
cheaper which were needed for the produc-
tion of gold. Table 111 shows t.hl\t, con-
sequent to this, gold production was doubled
from IU2H to 1939. In observing this huge
increase of gold production as a result of
the world commodity.price crash, one is
tempted to bt'1ieve in the old self.curing
powers R<l\-nnced by orthodox liberalism.
This belief would be llIade even more piquant
by t.he consideration that one of the most
enthusiastic gold-producing countries is Com-
munist Russia. But we must 'not let our-
selves be led astray. In the last analysis,
gold is not mined becalise some people or
other working at the production of gold
have the feeling that this gives them a
chance to work; no, it is mined solely be-
cause there i8 I!lomeone who is willing to
buy the gold.
However irrational Roosevelt's buying-
up of the world's gold harvest may seem,
we must fnce the fantastic fact that the
"champion of liberalism" is practically
wo~king t,oward a world monopoly of gold.
But why? What will happen to the value
of gold one day when a government of the
USA asks: "What are we to do with all
those vaults filled with gold?" What will
happen to the value of gold when the USA
stops her gold purchases one day? Tech-
nically speaking, this is quite feasible, for
the monetary system of the USA is suf-
ficiently advanced for her to be able to
secure a sta.ble enough trend of prices by
keeping & tight rein on bank-note circula-
tion. Thus, if Roosevelt decided to stop
the gold purchases, a serious· crash in the
price of gold and a correspondinR upward
rush of commodity prices would be un-
avoidable.
The fact that some of the devaluating
countries went off the gold standard beca.use
of a lack of gold reserves, and the others
in spite of more than sufficient gold re-
serves, proves that the gold reserve no
longer has any natural connection with the
,-alue of the currency. Gold h&8 become a.
commodity which has been given an artificial-
ly fixed price, as happened to silver not long
before. Roosevelt's cautious words men-
tioned above also go to show clearly that
gold is now only one of se"eral world com-
moditit's which have lost their price inertia.
and which are to be brought back to &
steady price trend by artificial means.
- The crux of the problem is to be found
in the qUelltion: why have so many world
oommodities-gold, silver, cotton, coffee,
wheat, rubber, tea, sugar-lost this inertia?
Why must they all be supported nation-
ally or internationally? One is obliged to
reply: scientific and technical developments
are offering increasing pos.'libilities of produc-
tion unrelated to labor or consumption, so
that the famous free play of forces is leading
t,o cha.()s. It is only large-scale plannillg
which can protect mankind from the con-
Requences of this trcnd. Gold is no longer
the means of safeguarding a steady trend in
the level of prices. The question of price
has become a task of national economic
policy, and the relationship of the price
levels among the independent economic
Gr08fJratl11lS will be an open problem of
economic policy. It is better for the nations
that the illusion should disappear that there
might be a mechanical solution here, as had
becn believed in the case of gold mechanism
in complete uisregard of the problem of
loans. The adjustment of trade between
the varioull Gr08Srallm,s will always remain
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when a gold.standard country like Franco
could do nothing whatever with her repara-
tions in gold. Even within the camp of the
gold-standard champions it has been ad-
mitted that it WllS the policy of reparations-
carried out a.gainst all better knowledge-
and the treatment of intcr-AUied debts
which finally brought a.bout the collapse of
all attempts to reintroduce the gold standlud
and led to the world economic crisis.
A medium of exchange such as gold can-
not function if its distribution is entirely
unequal. If cattle' was a medium of ex·
change in primitive times, and if a village
lost all its cattle through a disease, it could
not make any payments at all to a neigh-
boring village. Cattle money became mean-
ingless in the trade between these two
villages. The USA seems to have made up
her mind to destroy the meaning of gold
in the tracle between herself and most other
countries in the world. W-e simply cannot
imagine what the USA intends to do with
her present possession of eighty per cent of
the monetary gold of the world and her
vast lend·lease claims on the chief gold-
producing eount,ries, the British Empire and
the Soviet Union. Gold will become mean-
ingless and valueless. Even the plans of
Morgenlhau and Keynes cannot cover up
this fact, for they only seJlk to balnnce the
distribution of gold by means of credits, a
method which IIa8 already failed in the case
of the Dawes and Young Plans.
Shortly before the outbreak of the present
war, the general attitude reaUy seemed
clearer. At that time, no possibility was
envisaged of linking the various currencies
to gold any longer, as t,he ruthlessness und
incalculableness of Roosevelt's gold policy
was regarded an insurmountable obstacle.
The countries without gold had learned from
Germany's example how to get along without
gold, a'll the more so lUi they were uided by
the general trend of history which it:l towartl
an increasing strengthening of governmental
power llnd toward paper money. MorcO\-or,
modem mass production hllS made pos.'iible
such a rapid increase in the quantity of
goods that the quantity of means of pay-
ment based on gold cannot follow quickly
enough. The fundamental condition for a-
stable value of money is a balance between
the quantity of money and the qua.ntity of
goods, and such a balance can no longer be
warranted by gold. The function of gold
as a standard of value has become a thing
of the past.
GOLD AS A STANDARD
In the years from 600 B.C. to 1914, gold
simultaneously fulfilled the functions of a
medium of exchange and II. standard of
value. Before that, it had been a commodity
like any other, which could be given in
payment. After the Great War, gold be-
came a· standard of value again, but only to
a limited degree a means of pnyment. For
the inhabitants within a country, the posses-
sion of gold as a means of payment WllS
prohibited or impossible, and gold remained
a means of payment only in international
trade. This limited form of a gold-reserve
currency WllS a failure. It turned out that
the concentration of gold in the vaults of
tho central note· issuing banks facilitated a
sudden change in the value of gold. Indeed,
the consideration of maintaining a gold re-
serve was an obstacle to a steady trend in
the value of gold. When a state maintains
the value of itolj currency solely by keeping
a tight rein on the means of payment, thus
safeguarding a steady trend in the pur·
chasing power of the currency, its subject,s
nre botter protectod than if thcy have to
participate in the anxieties of the state over
maintaining a gold reserve.
In his famous work on money, Helfferich
describes the development of money as
follows. At first, certain commodities ful:
fiUed an extra monetary function (cattle,
salt, etc.). Then came the metals, whose
value restoo at first entirely and later
partially on the fact that the coins could
also be melted down and sold as a com-
modit,y. Then clune paper money, which is
valueless llS a commodity and which embodies
a purely monetary function. At first its
value was founded on the fact that it could
be exchanged for gold; today its value is
founded solely on the knowledge and sense
of reliponsibility of the country's ministers
of finance.
}"or its proper working, the gold standard
required not only an equal ratio of incre~
in gold production and world commodity
production: it required an economic baln.tlce
as a whole. In other words, it did not
create this balance. The problematical na-
ture of the gold standard became quite clear
a noble task. To discuss the technique of
its solution now would mean a premature
advance into the coming period of peace.
The practical means were demonstrated by
Germany in the years before the present
war.
tJOurln fCerm
Pennsylvania's Senator Joseph F. Guffey said:
"There is no American tradition which says that a good President
cannot serve four terms in the White House."
Baid a political wag: "There's a law against bigamy but none
against trigamy."
'Wnat ;s a Seep?
In recent months, "jeeps," a type of small cross-country
aut.omobile, have been mpntioned as being much in use in the US
AnDy. The other day we were asked what this word meant. All
we could think of was two exclamations we had often heard in
America: "Jumping Jeepers!" -and "Jeepers Creepers!" - But then
we had no proper idea of what these exclamations meant. We
- imagined vaguely that a jeep must be some sort of a bug or little
animal, perhaps to be found in the West. So we began to look up
dictionaries. But without success. Not even in Mencken's The
American Lang1Ulge was there the slightest hint. Then we applied
to one of our friends, an authority in the field of American slang.
"Why," he said, "that's quite simple: Jeep is Popeye's dog-you
know, the one that always rescued Sweetpea." -
But finally, after much guessing and many ques.tions, we
ran across an old American magazine which contained the history
of this vehicle. According to it, the small car was given all kinds
of fancy names when it first appeared: "iron pony," "blitz buggy,"
"leaping Lena," etc. But none of these names caught on. The
US Army authorities, meanwhile, prosaically dubbed the vehicles
"General Purpose Cars" or "G.P..Cars." "G.P.'s" soon turned into
"Jeeps," and that is the name that has stuck.
gold stocks are already far too high. Con-
sequently, the price of gold must be sup-
ported artificially, like that of diamonds,
cultured pearls, coffee, and rubber. H
eighty per cent of the world's gold stocks
remain in the hands of the USA, the price
of gold will be 80 much subject to political
whim that no other state can afford to place
its economy in dependence of so insecure a
standard. Indeed, no one will even risk
hoarding gold in large quantities. Thus the
price level of the one quarter of the world's
annual gold production which serves in-
dustrial and artistic purposes rests on a
very unstable basis.
From a technical point of view, gold has
retained its glitter and its constancy, and
it has not yet been possible to produce it
synthetically. But economically it has lost
its former comparative independence of state
and society, and with that half of its former
basis of value.
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WHAT TO DO WITH GOLD?
SO we must conclude by asking what
functions there remain for gold. Gold will
remain a stabilizing metal for currencies in
primitive countries with weak governments.
In addition to this, it may serve in more
higWy developed states with properly manip-
ulated paper currencies as a means for
balancing foreign-trade debits if these can·
not be balanced by cred.its because of la~king
confidence. The fixing of the value of gold
will, however, be an increasingly difficult
economic question, indf1ed, a question of
power. Thus we believe in a strong decline
in the use of gold, and it is hardly a coin-
cidence that not only Japan but also the
Anglo-American countries have curtailed
their gold production since 1942. At present
the reason given for the closure of gold
mines is that the workers nre needed for
war-important jobs. But even after the
war the gold mines will not be reopened,
for, in view of the limited uses, the existing
